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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Jamie Lee Nelson appeals from a judgment of conviction entered for possession 
of a controlled substance (methamphetamine) and possession of drug paraphernalia 
following a jury trial. On appeal, Ms. Nelson asserts that the district court erred when it 
denied her motion to suppress statements made in response to questioning by law 
enforcement officers while she was detained during a parole search of her house. 
Additionally, she asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it ordered that 
she pay, jointly and severally with her co-defendant, $2,535 in restitution for prosecution 
costs in the absence of any, let alone substantial, evidence to support such an award. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Jamie Lee Nelson was charged by Information with possession of a controlled 
substance (methamphetamine), misdemeanor injury to a child, and possession of drug 
paraphernalia. (R., pp.34-35.) Ms. Nelson filed a motion to suppress, inter a/ia, her 
responses to questions asked of her while she was detained in her residence during a 
parole search conducted pursuant to her husband's parole. (R., pp.67, 71-72.) After 
her motion to suppress was denied, the matter proceeded to a jury trial at which she 
and her husband were tried together. (See generally Tr.Vol.I and Tr.Vol.II.) Ms. Nelson 
was ultimately convicted of possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine) 
and possession of drug paraphernalia; she was acquitted of misdemeanor injury to a 
child. (Tr.Vol.II, p.457, Ls.1-9.) 
At the sentencing hearing, the State sought "$4,846 in restitution in this case ... 
joint[ly) and several[ly] with the co-defendant - and it breaks down to $100 for drug 
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testing also $4,746 in prosecution costs." (Sentencing Tr., p.14, L.17 - p.15, L.4.) 
When the district court sought clarification as to the prosecution costs, the State 
explained, "It accounts for approximately 39 hours of prosecution attorney time applied 
to the prosecutor in the case from the time the case hit district court." (Sentencing Tr., 
p.15, Ls.6-13.) 
Defense counsel objected to the reimbursement sought for the prosecuting 
attorney's time, 1 asking the district court to "flat deny it," explaining that "there's not 
documentation as to the prosecutor's request for their portion." (Sentencing Tr., p.23, 
Ls.13-18.) Alternatively, defense counsel requested that, if the court was inclined to 
award restitution, it "not enter an order today on the restitution but require the state to 
provide further documentation" and because "this case was tried twice because the 
state's witness caused a mistrial .... "2 (Sentencing Tr., p.23, L.20 - p.24, L.4.) 
Ultimately, the district court ordered, 
$2,535 in prosecution costs. While / recognize there were no other 
specific number[s] related to prosecution costs presented, I've arrived at 
that figure of 39 hours at $65 an hour for the total of $2,535. 
Now I recognize that the loaded benefit rate of an Ada County prosecuting 
attorney would come at about $65 an hour, and so without seeing that 
actual figure, I do find that that's a reasonable cost related to prosecution, 
and that doesn't include paper and paralegals and those sorts of issues. 
(Sentencing Tr., p.32, Ls.12-23 (emphases added).) The restitution ordered was joint 
and several with Ms. Nelson's husband. (Sentencing Tr., p.33, Ls.3-5.) 
Ms. Nelson filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (R., p.294.) 
1 Ms. Nelson did not object to the $100 laboratory fee. (Sentencing Tr., p.23, Ls.15-17.) 
2 The court minutes from the first trial reflect that it ended in a defense-requested 
mistrial when a State's witness "said the word [sic] probation officer." (R., pp.154-55.) 
The district court had previously granted a defense motion in limine prohibiting the State 
from introducing "any statements that Mrs. Nelson was on probation," concluding that 
such evidence would be "unduly prejudicial." (Motions Tr., p.98, Ls.18-22.) 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court err when it denied Ms. Nelson's motion to suppress 
statements made in response to questioning by law enforcement officers while 
she was detained during a parole search of her house? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it ordered Ms. Nelson to pay 
restitution for prosecution costs in the absence of any, let alone substantial, 
evidence to support such an award? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Nelson's Motion To Suppress Statements 
Made In Response To Questioning By Law Enforcement Officers While She Was 
Detained During A Parole Search Of Her House 
A. Introduction 
Ms. Nelson asserts that the district court erred when it denied her motion to 
suppress statements made in response to questioning by law enforcement officers while 
she was detained during a parole search of her house because she was questioned in 
circumstances that were the functional equivalent of being in custody without having 
been provided with Miranda warnings. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision 
on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court defers to the trial court's 
findings of fact if they were supported by substantial evidence, but will freely review the 
application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. See State v. Atkinson, 128 
Idaho 559, 561 (Ct. App. 1996). 
C. The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Nelson's Motion To Suppress 
Statements Made In Response To Questioning By Law Enforcement Officers 
While She Was Detained During A Parole Search Of Her House 
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, in relevant part, 
provides, "No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
against himself .... " U.S. CONST. AMEND. V. Similarly, the Idaho Constitution provides, 
"No person shall ... be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . 
. . . " ID. CONST. ART. I, SEC. 13. 
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In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the United States Supreme Court 
defined "custodial interrogation" as "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers 
after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of 
action in any significant way." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 (footnote omitted) (emphasis 
added). The Idaho Supreme Court has explained, "Even though a person is not 
formally arrested, 'the safeguards prescribed by Miranda become applicable as soon as 
a suspect's freedom of action is curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest."' 
State v. Munoz, 149 Idaho 121, 128-29 (2010) (internal punctuation omitted) (quoting 
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984)). "The 'custody' test is an objective 
one; it is not based on the subjective impressions in the minds of either the defendant or 
the law enforcement officer." State v. Massee, 132 Idaho 163, 165 (Ct. App. 1998). 
"[T]he only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect's position would 
have understood his situation." Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 442. 
In United States v. Hayden, 260 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2001), the Ninth Circuit 
explained that whether a person is in custody for purposes of Miranda is determined, 
under the totality of the circumstances, "according to whether 'a reasonable person in 
such circumstances would conclude after brief questioning [that] he or she would not be 
free to leave."' Hayden, 260 F.3d at 1066 (citation omitted) (brackets in original). 
Common factors in making this determination include: "(1) the language used to 
summon the individual; (2) the extent to which the defendant is confronted with 
evidence of guilt; (3) the physical surroundings of the interrogation; (4) the duration of 
the detention; and (5) the degree of pressure applied to detain the individual." Id. 
(citation omitted). 
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In United States v. Kim, 292 F.3d 969 (9th Cir. 2002), the Ninth Circuit applied 
the factors identified in Hayden when it considered whether the district court erred in 
finding that the defendant was in custody for purposes of Miranda. In that case, a deli 
owned by the defendant was the subject of an investigation into pseudoephedrine 
trafficking. The police executed a search warrant on the deli while the defendant was 
not present. The defendant and her husband went to the deli during the execution of 
the search warrant when they became concerned after being unable to reach their son, 
who was working at the deli that day, by telephone. Upon arrival, the defendant was 
allowed inside the store, while her husband was not. She was directed to a seating 
area during the search, and after "they sat her at another table," a detective began 
questioning her. At least two officers sat and stood around her during the questioning, 
which took place over the course of approximately forty-five minutes. During the 
interview, the defendant made incriminating statements regarding the sale of 
pseudoephedrine. Kim, 292 F.3d at 971-72. 
The Ninth Circuit "conclude[d) that Kim was 'in custody' for Miranda purposes 
because a reasonable person in Kim's circumstances would not have felt free to leave." 
Kim, 292 F.3d at 974. In considering the fact that the defendant had gone to the store 
and entered it voluntarily, the Ninth Circuit explained that, in doing so, the defendant 
had not done so "understanding that questioning would ensue." Id. (emphasis in 
original). The Ninth Circuit explained, "There is a critical distinction, however, between 
voluntarily entering one's own place of business without any intention to present oneself 
for a police interview, and voluntarily accompanying the police to their station upon 
request for the very purpose, known in advance, of answering their questions." Id. It 
went on to note that "[a]lthough Kim did arrive at the store voluntarily, she did not do so 
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to speak to the police," and the fact that the police did not summon her to the store "is 
therefore entirely uninformative in determining the dispositive question - whether Kim 
would have felt free to leave once the questioning started." Id. 
With the above principles in mind, an examination of the totality of the 
circumstances in Ms. Nelson's case reveals that Ms. Nelson was subjected to a 
custodial interrogation without Miranda. 
Ms. Nelson's encounter with the authorities began when Chris Colson, her 
husband's parole officer, arrived to conduct an unannounced search of their marital 
home for evidence that Mr. Nelson had violated his parole. (Motions Tr., p.31, L.1 -
p.33, L.16; p.35, Ls.3-10.) Officer Colson was accompanied by three other parole / 
probation officers: Polheamus, Samson, and Lake, along with Garden City Police 
Officers Lythgoe and Riley, assisted by a Garden City Police drug dog. (Motions Tr., 
p.34, Ls.3-21.) All of the officers present were armed. (Motions Tr., p.48, Ls.17-19.) 
Officer Colson had never before taken that many officers to search the Nelsons' home. 3 
(Motions Tr., p.48, L.20 - p.49, L.3.) 
Upon entering the home, Officer Colson saw Ms. Nelson, who was seated in the 
living room, and "as a standard officer safety procedure," told her to stay where she 
was. (Motions Tr., p.36, Ls.1-9; p.47, Ls.14-16.) When Ms. Nelson wanted to attend to 
her baby, who was in a back bedroom, she was not free to do so without officer 
assistance, and Officer Riley accompanied her when she went to retrieve her baby. 
(Motions Tr., p.47, L.24 - p.48, L.16.) 
3 Within ten minutes of the entry, Officers Lakey and Samson left to handle an unrelated 
incident. (Motions Tr., p.37, Ls.6-12.) Detectives Madden and Thorndyke later 
responded to the scene. (Motions Tr., p.42, Ls.11-20.) 
7 
Approximately thirty minutes after entering the Nelson home (Motions Tr., p.40, 
Ls.20-23), officers searching the master bathroom discovered a Crown Royal bag that 
contained "a white crystalline substance ... [that] looked like methamphetamine," as 
well as a "sippy cup" that appeared to have been modified for use in smoking 
methamphetamine. (Motions Tr., p.38, L.3 - p.39, L.3.) At that point, Officer Colson 
went out to the living room, and placed Mr. Nelson under arrest for the suspected 
methamphetamine and paraphernalia, handcuffed him, and had him sit back down on 
the couch. (Motions Tr., p.39, Ls.4-14.) 
Mr. Nelson then apologized to Ms. Nelson, at which point Ms. Nelson "said, you 
know, I told you so ... [and] basically stated, you know, I'd been clean for five years. I 
told you when you brought this stuff here this would happen." (Motions Tr., p.39, L 18 -
p.40, L.2.) One of the officers present (Officer Colson was not sure who) then asked 
Ms. Nelson whether she had "used," to which she replied "yes." Officer Colson then 
asked her "the last time that she'd used, and she stated that morning." (Motions Tr., 
p.40, Ls.3-9.) Officer Lythgoe testified that she asked Ms. Nelson whether she was on 
probation, to which she responded "yes," and "if she would piss hot, referring to a 
urinalysis," to which she again responded "yes."4 (Motions Tr., p.57, L.24 - p.58, L.15.) 
After being questioned by Officers Colson and Lythgoe, Detective Madden provided 
Ms. Nelson with Miranda warnings, at which point she invoked her right to remain silent. 
(Motions Tr., p.65, Ls.4-24; p.67, Ls.9-12.) 
In concluding that Ms. Nelson was not "in custody" for purposes of Miranda, the 
district court reasoned that she "was asked to stay in the front room, but she did not 
4 It appears likely that the officer was Officer Lythgoe. 
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object," that incrimination was "not the only reason" she was questioned,5 that the 
physical surroundings were her home, "not in a detention center, and not in a police 
car," that "the duration of the detention was reasonable in that the detention - up until 
the time of the search - was an hour, and that was at the time of any statements that 
were made by Officer Lythgoe to Miss Nelson." The district court went on to note that 
"she was simply asked to stay in the front room ... [with] no other pressure applied to 
her detention," that all six officers were not continuously in the room with her, "there's no 
evidence that Mrs. Nelson was aware that they were armed," and 
as to the extent to which the defendant was confronted, Officer Lythgoe 
stated that she spoke with Mrs. Nelson for only about a minute, and the 
question was whether she was on misdemeanor probation or whether she 
would be positive on a urinalysis, but that does not go directly to 
ownership of the drugs ... [s]o to that extent, the inquiry of Mrs. Nelson 
was minimal. 
(Motions Tr., p.91, L.3 - p.93, L.4.) The district court's decision to deny suppression of 
Ms. Nelson's statements applied to statements made in response to questioning by both 
Officers Colson and Lythgoe. (Motions Tr., p.93, Ls.16-24.) 
Unlike the defendant in Kim, Ms. Nelson did not enter her home voluntarily while 
police were already there; she was in her home when, unannounced, six police and 
probation officers, accompanied by a drug dog, entered her home and ordered her to 
remain on her couch. Thus, the means used to "summon" her were considerably more 
coercive in that she was not able to choose whether to remain. See United States v. 
Rodriguez-Preciado, 399 F.3d 1118, 1127 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding no error in trial court's 
determination that a suspect who arrived at a motel room during a police search was 
5 The district court's consideration of the officer's subjective intent was irrelevant to the 
determination, and should not have played a role in its decision. See Massee, 132 
Idaho at 165 ("The 'custody' test is an objective one; it is not based on the subjective 
impressions in the minds of either the defendant or the law enforcement officer."). 
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not in custody, for purposes of Miranda, given the fact that "[t]he officers explicitly 
informed him that their search had turned up no incriminating evidence, none of them 
displayed or otherwise brought attention to their weapons, and there was no intimation 
that they would not permit him to leave if he so desired."). Additionally, similar to Kim, 
Ms. Nelson was familiar with her surroundings inasmuch as the location of the 
interrogation was her home. This factor is less significant, however, given the fact that 
Ms. Nelson was substantially outnumbered by officers and was not allowed to go to her 
baby's bedroom without asking permission and being accompanied by an officer. 
With respect to the factor of being confronted with evidence of guilt, the officers 
questioned Ms. Nelson about her probation status and drug use only after discovering 
drugs and paraphernalia in her home and arresting her husband in front of her. See 
Rodriguez-Preciado, 399 F.3d at 1127 (one factor supporting the district court's finding 
of no custody was that "[t]he officers explicitly informed him that their search had turned 
up no incriminating evidence"). This is considerably more coercive than it would have 
been had the questioning occurred prior to the discovery of drugs and paraphernalia in 
the family home. An additional factor is that, prior to asking Ms. Nelson whether she 
would "piss hot" and when she had last ingested methamphetamine, she was asked 
whether she was on probation. Given her affirmative answer, the question would have 
caused a reasonable person to believe that she was required to answer questions 
regarding drug use as a condition of her probation. 
Considering the totality of the circumstances, most notably the factors identified 
in Hayden and discussed supra, it is clear that Ms. Nelson was subjected to custodial 
interrogation in the absence of Miranda warnings and that her statements must be 
suppressed. 
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11. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Ordered Ms. Nelson To Pay Restitution 
For Prosecution Costs In The Absence Of Any, Let Alone Substantial, Evidence To 
Support Such An Award 
A. Introduction 
Ms. Nelson asserts that, by ordering restitution for prosecution costs in the 
absence of any, let alone substantial, evidence to support such an award, the district 
court abused its discretion because, in doing so, it failed to act consistently with 
applicable legal standards and failed to reach its decision by an exercise of reason. 
B. Standard Of Review 
A trial court's decision to order restitution is discretionary, and "[a)n abuse of 
discretion may be shown if the order of restitution was the result of arbitrary action 
rather than logical application of the proper [statutory] factors .... " State v. Richmond, 
137 Idaho 35, 37 (Ct. App. 2002) (citation omitted). In reviewing for an abuse of 
discretion, an appellate court "must determine whether the trial court: (1) correctly 
perceived the issue as one involving the exercise of discretion; (2) acted within the outer 
boundaries of its discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to 
specific choices it had; and (3) reached its decision by an exercise of reason." Id. 
(citation omitted). 
C. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Ordered Ms. Nelson To Pay 
Restitution For Prosecution Costs In The Absence Of Any, Let Alone Substantial, 
Evidence To Support Such An Award 
Idaho Code§ 37-2732(k), in relevant part, provides: 
Upon conviction of a felony or misdemeanor violation under this chapter .. 
. the court may order restitution for costs incurred by law enforcement 
agencies in investigating the violation. Law enforcement agencies shall 
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include ... county ... prosecuting attorney offices. Costs shall include, 
but not be limited to ... prosecution expenses actually incurred, including 
regular salaries of employees. 
I.C. § 37-2732(k) (emphases added). 
In light of the lack of "specific guidance regarding the nature of a restitution 
award or the procedure to obtain such an award" under I.C. § 37-2732(k), the Idaho 
Supreme Court considers the general restitution statute, I. C. § 19-5304. State v. 
Gomez, 153 Idaho 253, 258 (2012). When considering the general restitution statute, 
the Idaho Court of Appeals has explained that "the amount of the award must be 
supported by substantial evidence" and is to be determined "based upon the civil 
preponderance of the evidence standard." In re Doe, 146 Idaho 277, 284 (Ct. App. 
2008) (citations omitted). 
In this case, the State did not present any, let alone substantial, evidence to 
support its requested restitution for "prosecution costs." (See generally Sentencing Tr.) 
Defense counsel pointed out this deficiency when objecting to the State's request. 
(Sentencing Tr., p.23, Ls.13-18.) The lack of any evidence to support the State's 
request becomes even more evident in light of the district court's explanation that it was 
assuming that the "loaded benefit rate of an Ada County prosecuting attorney would 
come at about $65" because it was not provided with an "actual figure." (Sentencing 
Tr., p.32, Ls.12-23.) 
In light of the drug restitution statute's specific language that restitution may only 
be awarded for costs actually "incurred" by law enforcement agencies, and that 
recoverable prosecution expenses are limited to those "actually incurred," as well as the 
requirement, taken from the general restitution statute, that any restitution award must 
be supported by substantial evidence and awarded only when it is established by a 
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preponderance of the evidence, the complete lack of any evidence supporting the 
district court's restitution order for prosecution costs in the amount of $2,535 mandates 
that the award be set aside. In light of the State's failure to accept defense counsel's 
magnanimous offer that it provide actual evidence to support its request at a separate 
hearing, Ms. Nelson respectfully requests that, on remand, the State be barred from 
seeking to establish restitution for prosecution costs. 
Alternatively, assuming that this Court finds that the State presented substantial 
evidence to support an award of restitution, ordering restitution for time spent on the first 
trial (which ended in a mistrial caused by a State's witness violating a pre-trial order) 
was inappropriate because it was not caused by Ms. Nelson's conduct. In light of the 
State's failure to establish how much of the restitution sought was for the first trial, 
Ms. Nelson respectfully requests that, if this Court does not grant her preferred relief, it 
remand this matter for a restitution hearing at which the State must establish how much 
of the restitution sought was for the first trial, so that it may be excluded from any 
restitution award. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Ms. Nelson respectfully requests that this Court 
vacate her judgment of conviction and reverse the district court's order denying her 
motion to suppress her challenged statements. In the alternative, if this Court rejects 
her suppression argument, she respectfully requests that it vacate the district court's 
order imposing $2,535 in restitution for prosecution costs. 
DATED this 8th day of August, 2013. 
SPEl\fCE~J.HAHN 
Depuf,y~91te Appellate Public Defender 
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